66 The Perils of Proliferation I 67 a superb deterrent” and argues that both Germany and Ukraine should be encouraged to become nuclear powers in the post-Cold War era.3 Other neorealist scholars reach similar conclusions: Stephen Van Evera calls for German acquisition of a nuclear arsenal to deter Russia Barry Posen recommends that Ukraine should keep nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Russian military intervention Peter Lavoy predicts that nuclear weapons will prevent future wars between India and Pakistan and Shai Feldman argues that nuclear proliferation in the Middle East can stabilize the Arab-Israeli ~onflict.~ The logic of this ”proliferation optimist” position flows easily from the expected-utility assumptions of rational deterrence theory: the possession of nuclear weapons by two powers reduces the likelihood of war precisely because it makes the costs of war so great. 66-107 Q 1994 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusettslnstitute of Technology. Also see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ”Nuclear Peace Through Selective Nuclear Proliferation” (unpublished manuscript, the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1987). Riker, ”An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” lourid of Conflicf Xesolrttion, Vol. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Waltz, Tlze Sprend of Nuclear Weqmris:More Mny Be Better, Adelphi Paper No.

Financial support was provided by the Nuclear History Program and Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms Control. For helpful comments I thank Richard Betts, George Bunn, Michael Desch, Lynn Eden, Peter Feaver, Neil Joeck, John Mearsheimer, George Perkovich, William Potter, and Jessica Stern.

Sagaii is Assistant Professor of Political Screrzce at Stanford Uniuersity. decreases to zero when all nations are nuclear armed.‘’2 John Mearsheimer believes that ”nuclear weapons are Scotf D. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker advocate spreading nuclear weapons into areas where non-nuclear states face nuclear-armed adversaries since ”the chance of bilateral conflict becoming nuclear. Kenneth Waltz’s 1981 monograph-The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better-presented the first detailed and forceful set of arguments in favor of proliferation.’ Since that time, however, a significant number of rational choice and neorealist political scientists have jumped onto the pro-proliferation bandwagon. A prominent group of political scientists have pointed to the apparent contradiction between a peaceful nuclear past and a fearful nuclear future and argue that the further spread of nuclear weapons will be a stabilizing factor in international relations. New nuclear powers, with similar characteristics of rivalry, are considered unlikely to maintain stable deterrence. On the other hand, it is also widely believed that the continuing spread of nuclear weapons will greatly increase the risks of nuclear war. The two superpowers avoided war despite a deep geopolitical rivalry, repeated crises, and a prolonged arms race. On the one hand, it is widely believed that nuclear weapons were an important factor in maintaining the ”long peace” between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Sagan A n apparent contradiction lies at the center of our understandings about nuclear weapons and deterrence. The Perils o f proliferation Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Scott D. In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

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